Controversy and
Confrontation. Relating controversy analysis with argumentation theory
by Frans H. van Eemeren and Bart Garssen (eds.)
Amsterdam/Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Company, 2008
Reviewed by María G. Navarro
Since the first volume appeared in
2005, the collection Controversies has
brought together pieces of work related to the field of argumentation, giving
particular attention to those that are concerned with theoretical and practical
problems connected with discursive controversy and confrontation. Authors such
as P. Barrotta, M. Dascal, S. Frogel, H. Chang and D. Walton had already either
edited or written previous editions to the present volume (volume six) of the
collection. F. H. van Eemeren and B. Garssen (the former has already, with P.
Houtlosser, edited the second volume of this collection) are responsible for
compiling and editing this collection.
In this
volume Van Eemeren and Garssen edit works they conceive as being akin to those
elements which, in argumentation discourse, serve to resolve – or often to
present – differences of opinion. However, it should be added that this is not
a mere editing job, but rather the result of an intellectual collaboration
between two international research groups dedicated to a common field –
consisting, on the one hand, of controversies and, on the other, of
argumentation.
Readers may
well ask themselves frankly what the study of controversies (represented by the
research team led by M. Dascal and the International
Association for the Study of Controversies —IASC—) has to contribute to the
field of argumentation (represented by the research team linked to Van Eemeren
and the Society for the Study of
Argumentation —ISSA—), and vice versa. Are the governing communication
principles within controversies the same as those that must be present in all
consistent argumentation? Do controversies differ according to the area of
research or communication in which they are carried on? And in what epoch? Does
the last question cast any light on the argumentation processes as such? Is a
prior argumentation theory needed to analyse controversies?
In the
chapter Dichotomies and types of debate, the
Leibnizian thinker, Marcelo Dascal, lines up the practical and theoretical
consequences of using dichotomies for controversial discourses. Dascal presents
this research topic concerning the nature of dichotomies with the aid of an
example he offers as paradigmatic: the case of the polemical discourse between
Leo Strauss and Alfred Stern about historicism. Taking two quotations from
these authors, Dascal presents the Stern-Strauss polemic as a variant of the
absolutism versus relativism debate.
Stern’s position consists of considering historicism as an antithesis of the
fundamental idea claimed by defenders of the existence of natural right or,
ultimately, a universal concept of humanity or a conception of human reason
identical with itself and timeless, in spite of any socio-cultural differences.
Subsequently, Dascal brings in a quote from Strauss, in which the author states
that if human intelligence has been unable to resolve the problem of the
principles of justice in a universally valid way, then the idea of natural
right as such seems untenable. Both authors present a critique of a thesis with
which their own position is antithetical. Considering that their positions are
(taken individually) antithetical or incompatible with respect to the opposing
thesis put forward by each of them, neither author presents an alternative to
the dichotomy, but instead both carry to extremes the image of a historicism
that, ultimately, is nothing more than an undoubtedly exaggerated concept and a
product of their dichotomic discursive strategy. In discursive strategies that
present an unsurmounted dichotomy, we often find a radicalisation of
incompatibility presented in the form of a polarity, to which there is no
apparent alternative. In this connection, in his contribution to the volume,
Dascal delves into the concept of de-dichotomisation,
and also the so-called discursive
strategies of de-dichotomisation, in order to present another
characteristic mark of controversies: that these extremes appear in them only
at first, as they are surmounted at once, or else they simply overflow. The
investigation presented by Dascal stems from the familiar Leibnizian
distinction between the concepts of discussion, dispute and controversy – a
distinction the Argentinean philosopher Ezequiel de Olaso liked to recall in
many of his writings.
In the
chapter Charles Darwin versus George
Mivart, Anna Carolina Regner describes a familiar polemic in the light of a
conceptual framework and argumentation strategies which, from the point of view
of the controversy to which they gave rise, contributed firstly to the shaping
and then to the defence of certain scientific theories. Regner’s standpoint is
interesting in that she highlights the fact that the different theories of
argumentation with which one may tackle polemical discursive exchanges are also
models that serve to capture, structure and evaluate the arguments considered
as cases.
In Scientific demarcation and metascience, Thomas
M. Lessl calls attention to a matter related to the recognition of science’s
speculative aspects. When the speculative dimension of science is played down
so as to contrast and distinguish scientific discourse with respect to
religious or moral discourse, we immediately run the risk of stripping value
from certain public commitments to decision-making which often accompany the
discovery and support of the results of research. Lessl mentions, for example,
the case of global warming.
In Reforming the Jews, rejecting
marginalization: The 1799 German debate of Jewish emancipation in its
controversy context, Mirela Saim reflects on the controversial polemic
between D. Friedländer, W. A. Teller and F. Schleiermacher concerning the
baptisms of convenience in the light of the controversial problem of Jewish
people’s rights in 18th century Europe. The author concentrates on
the argument put forward in this respect by Friedländer, and finally maintains
that his inclination (somewhat rhetorical) to accept the baptisms of
convenience reflects the desperation of the Jewish people about their own
condition.
In chapter six, Gerd Fritz proposes an inquiry
in Communication principles for
controversies: A historical perspective. Fritz claims that it is by virtue
of certain principles of communication that controversies are presented to us
in an ordered or accessible form from the point of view of their configuration
or practical deliberation. The author plots a prototypically Leibnizian course
in the study of controversy and mentions a very complete line-up of principles
relating to the existence of controversies, with the idea that only they can
guide polemical discourse. Fritz gives particular attention to the studies
undertaken by Goldenbaum and Dieckmann of the 18th and 19th
centuries in the light of different controversies that took place in Germany.
The principles set out by Fritz are eminently practical in the sense that they
would have to guide the conduct of polemicists; and, in fact, they were
observed, for better or worse, as maxims or rules applied to discourse in the
European university culture of modern times. Therefore, all of them are related
to, and, in a way, subject to the principles of courtesy that ensure social
order, effectiveness and acceptability of not only controversies themselves,
but also of controversial conduct.
On the role of pragmatics, rhetoric and dialectic
in scientific controversies, Ademar Ferreira claims that scientific activity has always been immersed
in controversies. However, the fact that some discussions come to attain the
rank of controversies must be attributed to aspects such as the cognitive goals
and assumptions implicit in the inquiry. The article presents an analysis of
the scientific production of knowledge in line with a model or, rather, a
conception of language according to which a relation exists between the process
of generation and that of knowledge justification. Ferreira arrives at the
conclusion that language is profoundly bound up with the cognitive processes
relating to scientific inquiry, as well as with the supposed increase of
knowledge.
In A “dialectic ladder” of refutation and
dissuasion, Cristina Marras and Enrico Euli present an imaginary scenario
relating to the taxonomy of six conflicts of a social and political type. With
the aim of changing traditional notions used for dissuasion and refutation,
they choose arenas associated with likeness, convergence, analogy and
compatibility.
In Responding
to objections, Ralph H. Johnson underlines the importance of knowing how to
respond to objections in order to develop the activity of producing good
arguments. In his article he concentrates especially on two questions: what
makes an objection a strong one; and what could be the possible responses to a
(strong) objection, aside from the factors that determine the strength of a
determinate response to an objection. Johnson analyses the three possible
scenarios relating to the response to an objection, namely: when the person
arguing considers the objection to be lacking in strength and, therefore,
maintains her original argument; when the person arguing understands the
objection to have a certain strength but of a minor nature; and, lastly, when
the objection is a strong one and, therefore, the stated argument must be
revised. In the light of this classification, Johnson claims that the identity
of an argument is the function relating its propositional content to its
subsequent inferential relations. Moreover, he adds that insofar as the said
relation does not prevent the said identity from being preserved, to that
extent the argument’s identity is in fact preserved. This would indicate that
the property to which Johnson alludes may become evident only as a result of
criticism, so that the identity and integrity of an argument can manifest
themselves only throughout the history of their dialectic relation with
objections of a different nature and, especially, with those that turn out to
be strong.
In Pragmatic inconsistency and credibility Jan
Albert van Laar establishes the existence of three types of variants when it
comes to assessing pragmatic inconsistency as a strategic manoeuvre. Van Laar
asserts that there are dialectic situations in which inconsistency is
legitimate, and he examines them in line with the distinction, set out by E. C.
W. Krabbe, between the fundamental level of dialogue and metadialogue.
Frans van Eemeren, Bart Garssen and Bert
Meuffels are responsible for the chapter entitled Reasonableness in confrontation: Empirical evidence concerning the
assessment of ad hominem fallacies. In their contribution, the authors
examine how far reasons for rejecting ad hominem
fallacies relate to values derived from the principle of courtesy. In order to
maintain their point of view – according to which the rejection of the use of
fallacious arguments of the type mentioned is not to be attributed strictly to
values of courtesy – they claim up to five sources of empirical evidence for
discounting the above explanation. These sources consist of the results of
surveys carried out in five countries: Holland, United Kingdom, Spain and
Indonesia and relate to the degree of reasonableness that the respondents were
inclined to grant to the ad hominem
fallacies. This first part of their reflections leads to a second, in which a
relation is established between reasonableness and persuasion in discussions.
It is claimed that in ordinary discussions we tend to consider as persuasive
that which we consider reasonable and that, in its turn, our conception of what
is reasonable corresponds with the theoretical-critical rules of the
pragma-dialectic theory of argumentation that they (the authors) put forward.
Managing disagreement space in multi-party
deliberation deals
with the difficult subject of decision-making in deliberative processes. Mark
Aakhus and Alena L. Vasilyeva present the problem posed by the potential for
disagreement when it is extended and reinforced to the point that
decision-making seems impossible. The authors analyse the empirical case of a
meeting in a small town in the north-east of the USA between local leaders and
the representatives of an urban development company who are discussing a
housing plan designed for that community. The authors analyse the notion of
disagreement space in this case. To this end they follow the basic principles
of the pragma-dialectic theory of Van Eemeren and Grootendorst.
In Predicaments
of politicization in the debate over abstinence-only sex education, Sally
Jackson analyses a report written by scientists from different fields, which
appeared in 2004 under the George W. Bush administration. Scientific Integrity in Policy-making: An Investigation into the Bush
Administration’s Misuse of Science, was the title of the said manifesto. It
set out to denounce the placing of scientific discoveries at the service of
political ends, and also the illegitimate practices with which such acts were
carried on, salient among which was the selection of politicians to participate
as members of scientific groups with consultative functions. With this debate
in mind, the author examines the science politics of the said administration in
topics relating to sex education. Lastly, Jackson claims that the political
debate generally develops on a very different plane to others, ending up by
referring to problems concerning some values and goals or others. The
limitations implicit in this approach (that used by politics) make it an
appropriate place to set out differences of opinion and disagreements, but they
disqualify it as a medium for the resolution of those same oppositions.
In Rhetoric of science, pragma-dialectics, and
science studies Gábor Kutrovátz devotes a chapter to analysing the effects
of T. Kuhn’s work on scientific practice, with special attention to the fact
that the linguistic medium is considered more and more to be a constitutive
part of the scientific production of knowledge. The author brings the pragma-dialectic
viewpoint closer to certain social studies of science. Also, Gábor A. Zemplén
uses the pragma-dialectic model to study part of the Newton-Lucas
correspondence in the last chapter, Scientific
controversies and the pragma-dialectical model.
From a
final reading of the book one appreciates clearly the need to identify the
structure and strategic use of arguments so as to integrate even more
systematically both schools of thought: the one originating from studies of
controversies and the other from the field of argumentation theories.
Van Eemeren
and Garssen present this volume as the result of a joint study of convergence
and rapprochement. The editors consider – rightly, in my opinion – that the
application of the argumentation field to the analysis of argumentational
confrontations, and even to controversies, will do well to go beyond and
surpass studies centring on the experimental sciences in order to concentrate
on political and cultural ambits in a broad sense. Meanwhile, this volume already
contributes substantively to the argumentational study of confrontation and to
that of controversy.
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